pragmatism.org | John Dewey, American Pragmatist. Website with loads of publications and/or information of publications by Dewey and by thers on Dewey.
Many ideas attributed to constructivism really belong to the older and more comprehensive ideology of progressivism. Because contemporary authors are not in the habit to furnish exact sources for these ideas except blanket reference to, for example, John Dewey or Jean Piaget, it is a major problem in critical discourse that concepts like discovery learning typically are presented as self-evident or self-expaining, not as the rhetorical invention of this or that author on pp xx to yy in a named publication. A big surprise, therefore, to read Kieran Egan’s Getting it wrong from the beginning, supplying all those sordid details in a well written small book! I hope to be able to use it as the starting point of my own inventory of the sources of the main progressive misconceptions in education circles.
Kieran Egan (). Getting it wrong from the beginning. The mismatch between school and children's minds. webpage
Kieran Egan (2002). Getting it wrong from the beginning. Our progressivist inheritance from Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget. New Haven: Yale University Press. isbn 0300094337
Egan seems to lean towards constructivism/situationism, making his own psychology a bit less useful. I come across the first clear statement of his ideology on p. 72
Getting it wrong from the beginning p. 72.
For what is the problem with this statement of Egan, see Anderson, Reder & Simon 1998.
This is exactly the ideology that is playing havoc with Dutch arithmetics teaching and testing, the common core math standards [‘referentieniveaus rekenen’ as they are called in the Netherlands] and the infamous #rekentoets in Dutch exit exams, possibly triggering a major political crisis in the next twelve months.
Obscurantism in Holland: Paul Drijvers, 'mathematical thinking activities', now state pedagogy (incorporated in national exit exams in secondary education) http://www.rug.nl/education/lerarenopleiding/professionalisering/studiedagen/drijvers.pdf
Ellen Condliffe Lagemann (2000). An Elusive Science: The Troubling History of Education Research. University of Chicago Press. isbn 0226467724 review short review & 1997 article
Chapter 2 on John Dewey: Specialization and isolation: Education research becomes a profession (John Dewey’s youth and early career ; Dewey at the laboratory school ; A creative community: the social sources of Dewey’s thought ; Edward L. Thorndike: Conquering the new world of pedagogy ; Thorndike and Teachers College: A reciprocal relationship ; Dewey displaced: Charles Hubbard Judd at the University of Chicago ; )
M. D. Shipman (1971). Education and modernisation. Faber and Faber. isbn 0571095992
Special: no mention of Rousseau, Dewey, Spencer, Piaget, Pestalozzi.
J. D. C. Branger (1995). Twee eeuwen voor de klas. Lerarenopleiding basisonderwijs Haarlem. Haarlem: De Vrieseborch.
Zegt deze geschiedenis het nodige over de impact van Rousseau, Spencer, Dewey op het kweekschoolonderwijs in Nederland? Jawel hoor: directeur Prinsen was bewonderaar van Pestalozzi (blz. 23): Alle kennis berust op aanschouwing. Meer over vernieuwing: hoofdstuk 4, p. 77 e.v.
W. K. Frankena (1965). Three historical philosophies of education. Aristotle, Kant, Dewey. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresmann and company.
Joop Berding (1999). De participatie-pedagogiek van John Dewey. Proefschrift Vrije Universiteit. isbn 9090131523
George R. Geiger (1958). John Dewey in perspective. Oxford University Press. lccc 58-9463
George Dykhuizen (1973). The life and mind of John Dewey. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. isbn 0809306166
John Dewey & Evelyn Dewey (1915). Schools of to-morrow. E. P. Dutton. archive.org
The opening pages present the progressivist ideology, in the words of Rousseau, not those of Spencer. Beautiful expressions of the end-of-the-18th-century educational ideology, fully embraced by Dewey & Dewey.
To find out how to make knowledge when it is needed is the true end of the acquisition of information in school, not the information itself.
John Dewey & Evelyn Dewey (1915). Schools of to-morrow., p. 14-16
I tweeted this one!
Now what are Dewey & Dewey saying, ‘burn your books’? Really unbelievable. Many references in this book: to Rousseau, not to Herbert Spencer.
John Dewey & Evelyn Dewey (1915). Schools of to-morrow., p. 15
J. J. McDermott (ed.) (1973). The philosophy of John Dewey. University of Chicago Press. isbn 0226144011
Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn (Eds.) (1951/1989). The philosophy of John Dewey. Open Court. isbn 0812691024
Jerome A. Popp (1998). Naturalizing philosophy of education. John Dewey in the Postanalytic Period. Southern Illinois University Press. isbn 0809321718
Samuel Blumenfeld (). Preface to John Dewey's Plan to Dumb-Down America. web page
John Dewey (1898). The Primary-Education Fetich. FORUM, Vol. XXV, May 1898, Pages 315 to 328 transcription
Henry T. Edmondson III (2006). John Dewey and the decline of american education. How the patron saint of schools has corrupted teaching and learning. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books. preview
David Vaillancourt (Feb 18, 2016). The Dewey deception. blog
Greg Ashman (Jan 2, 2016) on progressivism here
Horatio Speaks (Jan 1, 2016) on the traditional - progressive debate being ‘boring’ here
Greg Ashman (Dec 31, 2015) on the UK debate between traditionalism and progressivism in education here
J. E. Stone (1996). Developmentalism: An Obscure but Pervasive Restriction on Educational Improvement. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 4. open access
Developmentalism is just another term for progressivism.
The ascendance of developmentalism in America may be related to an early belief about education as a cause of madness. According to Makari (1993), Rousseau's "education naturelle" was presaged by the writings of John Locke in 1691 and Giambattista Vico in 1709. Vico believed that children develop through a series of immutable phases and he condemned educational practices not in harmony with the "natural" progression. He considered abstract Cartesian thought to be particularly harmful. Vico's supposition that that which appears to be unnatural is apt to harmful has been echoed repeatedly even to the present day. Proponents of "developmentally appropriate" teaching practice, for example, believe that the use of incentives with young children are likely to be damaging.
John Dewey (1916). Democracy and education : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. The Macmillan Company. pdf or in Project Gutenberg download
Dewey maakt veel werk van opvattingen van Aristoteles, maar ik vind geen bronnen daarvoor vermeld. De Politics? Zou iemand die al eens hebben opgezocht?
summary p. 192
Individually and collectively there is a gulf between merely living and living worthily. In order that one may live worthily he must first live, and so with collective society. The time and energy spent upon mere life, upon the gaining of subsistence, detracts from that available for activities that have an inherent rational meaning; they also unfit for the latter. Means are menial, the serviceable is servile. The true life is possible only in the degree in which the physical necessities are had without effort and without attention. Hence slaves, artisans, and women are employed in furnishing the means of subsistence in order that others, those adequately equipped with intelligence, may live the life of leisurely concern with things intrinsically worth while.
To these two modes of occupation, with their distinction of servile and free activities (or "arts") correspond two types of education: the base or mechanical and the liberal or intellectual. Some persons are trained by suitable practical exercises for capacity in doing things, for ability to use the mechanical tools involved in turning out physical commodities and rendering personal service. This training is a mere matter of habituation and technical skill; it operates through repetition and assiduity in application, not through awakening and nurturing thought. Liberal education aims to train intelligence for its proper office: to know. The less this knowledge has to do with practical affairs, with making or producing, the more adequately it engages intelligence. So consistently does Aristotle draw the line between menial and liberal education that he puts what are now called the "fine" arts, music, painting, sculpture, in the same class with menial arts so far as their practice is concerned. They involve physical agencies, assiduity of practice, and external results. In discussing, for example, education in music he raises the question how far the young should be practiced in the playing of instruments. His answer is that such practice and proficiency may be tolerated as conduce to appreciation; that is, to understanding and enjoyment of music when played by slaves or professionals. When professional power is aimed at, music sinks from the liberal to the professional level. One might then as well teach cooking, says Aristotle. Even a liberal concern with the works of fine art depends upon the existence of a hireling class of practitioners who have subordinated the development of their own personality to attaining skill in mechanical execution. The higher the activity the more purely mental is it; the less does it have to do with physical things or with the body. The more purely mental it is, the more independent or self-sufficing is it. These last words remind us that Aristotle again makes a distinction of superior and inferior even within those living the life of reason. For there is a distinction in ends and in free action, according as one's life is merely accompanied by reason or as it makes reason its own medium. That is to say, the free citizen who devotes himself to the public life of his community, sharing in the management of its affairs and winning personal honor and distinction, lives a life accompanied by reason. But the thinker, the man who devotes himself to scientific inquiry and philosophic speculation, works, so to speak, in reason, not simply by *. Even the activity of the citizen in his civic relations, in other words, retains some of the taint of practice, of external or merely instrumental doing. This infection is shown by the fact that civic activity and civic excellence need the help of others; one cannot engage in public life all by himself. But all needs, all desires imply, in the philosophy of Aristotle, a material factor; they involve lack, privation; they are dependent upon something beyond themselves for completion. A purely intellectual life, however, one carries on by himself, in himself; such assistance as he may derive from others is accidental, rather than intrinsic. In knowing, in the life of theory, reason finds its own full manifestation; knowing for the sake of knowing irrespective of any application is alone independent, or self-sufficing. Hence only the education that makes for power to know as an end in itself. without reference to the practice of even civic duties, is truly liberal or free. 2. The Present Situation. If the Aristotelian conception represented just Aristotle's personal view, it would be a more or less interesting historical curiosity. It could be dismissed as an illustration of the lack of sympathy or the amount of academic pedantry which may coexist with extraordinary intellectual gifts. But Aristotle simply described without confusion and without that insincerity always attendant upon mental confusion, the life that was before him. That the actual social situation has greatly changed since his day there is no need to say. But in spite of these changes, in spite of the abolition of legal serfdom, and the spread of democracy, with the extension of science and of general education (in books, newspapers, travel, and general intercourse as well as in schools), there remains enough of a cleavage of society into a learned and an unlearned class, a leisure and a laboring class, to make his point of view a most enlightening one from which to criticize the separation between culture and utility in present education. Behind the intellectual and abstract distinction as it figures in pedagogical discussion, there looms a social distinction between those whose pursuits involve a minimum of selfdirective thought and aesthetic appreciation, and those who are concerned more directly with things of the intelligence and with the control of the activities of others.
Aristotle was certainly permanently right when he said that "any occupation or art or study deserves to be called mechanical if it renders the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise and practice of excellence." The force of the statement is almost infinitely increased when we hold, as we nominally do at present, that all persons, instead of a comparatively few, are free. For when the mass of men and all women were regarded as unfree by the very nature of their bodies and minds, there was neither intellectual confusion nor moral hypocrisy in giving them only the training which fitted them for mechanical skill, irrespective of its ulterior effect upon their capacity to share in a worthy life. He was permanently right also when he went on to say that "all mercenary employments as well as those which degrade the condition of the body are mechanical, since they deprive the intellect of leisure and dignity," -- permanently right, that is, if gainful pursuits as matter of fact deprive the intellect of the conditions of its exercise and so of its dignity. If his statements are false, it is because they identify a phase of social custom with a natural necessity. But a different view of the relations of mind and matter, mind and body, intelligence and social service, is better than Aristotle's conception only if it helps render the old idea obsolete in fact -- in the actual conduct of life and education.
Aristotle was permanently right in assuming the inferiority and subordination of mere skill in performance and mere accumulation of external products to understanding, sympathy of appreciation, and the free play of ideas. If there was an error, it lay in assuming the necessary separation of the two: in supposing that there is a natural divorce between efficiency in producing commodities and rendering service, and self-directive thought; between significant knowledge and practical achievement. We hardly better matters if we just correct his theoretical misapprehension, and tolerate the social state of affairs which generated and sanctioned his conception. We lose rather than gain in change from serfdom to free citizenship if the most prized result of the change is simply an increase in the mechanical efficiency of the human tools of production. So we lose rather than gain in coming to think of intelligence as an organ of control of nature through action, if we are content that an unintelligent, unfree state persists in those who engage directly in turning nature to use, and leave the intelligence which controls to be the exclusive possession of remote scientists and captains of industry. We are in a position honestly to criticize the division of life into separate functions and of society into separate classes only so far as we are free from responsibility for perpetuating the educational practices which train the many for pursuits involving mere skill in production, and the few for a knowledge that is an ornament and a cultural embellishment. In short, ability to transcend the Greek philosophy of life and education is not secured by a mere shifting about of the theoretical symbols meaning free, rational, and worthy. It is not secured by a change of sentiment regarding the dignity of labor, and the superiority of a life of service to that of an aloof self-sufficing independence. Important as these theoretical and emotional changes are, their importance consists in their being turned to account in the development of a truly democratic society, a society in which all share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy leisure. It is not a mere change in the concepts of culture -- or a liberal mind -- and social service which requires an educational reorganization; but the educational transformation is needed to give full and explicit effect to the changes implied in social life. The increased political and economic emancipation of the "masses" has shown itself in education; it has effected the development of a common school system of education, public and free. It has destroyed the idea that learning is properly a monopoly of the few who are predestined by nature to govern social affairs. But the revolution is still incomplete. The idea still prevails that a truly cultural or liberal education cannot have anything in common, directly at least, with industrial affairs, and that the education which is fit for the masses must be a useful or practical education in a sense which opposes useful and practical to nurture of appreciation and liberation of thought.
1. The Opposition of Experience and True Knowledge. As livelihood and leisure are opposed, so are theory and practice, intelligence and execution, knowledge and activity. The latter set of oppositions doubtless springs from the same social conditions which produce the former conflict; but certain definite problems of education connected with them make it desirable to discuss explicitly the matter of the relationship and alleged separation of knowing and doing. The notion that knowledge is derived from a higher source than is practical activity, and possesses a higher and more spiritual worth, has a long history. The history so far as conscious statement is concerned takes us back to the conceptions of experience and of reason formulated by Plato and Aristotle. Much as these thinkers differed in many respects, they agreed in identifying experience with purely practical concerns; and hence with material interests as to its purpose and with the body as to its organ. Knowledge, on the other hand, existed for its own sake free from practical reference, and found its source and organ in a purely immaterial mind; it had to do with spiritual or ideal interests. Again, experience always involved lack, need, desire; it was never self-sufficing. Rational knowing on the other hand, was complete and comprehensive within itself. Hence the practical life was in a condition of perpetual flux, while intellectual knowledge concerned eternal truth.
Josep Kahne (1994). Democratic Educational Practices and the Constraining Culture of Mainstream Policy Analysis. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (New Orleans, LA, ApriL 4-8, 1994). https://archive.org/stream/ERIC_ED375520/ERIC_ED375520
Despite Dewey's influence on educational thought, those with progressive visions of democratic education are generally on the margins of educational policy and practice. One notable exception was the "Eight-Year Study," a landmark attempt to design, implement, and evaluate democratic secondary schools. The Eight-Year Study was begun in 1930 by the Progressive Education Association (PEA) and the Commission on the Relation of School and College. It studied alternative programs in two school districts (Denver and Tulsa), 26 other schools, and 300 colleges and universities. A total of 1,475 students in alternative programs were matched with nonparticipants and interviewed over the next 8 years. Although the Eight-Year Study was important, it failed to bring progressive educational practices to U.S. high schools. Examination of this effort permits consideration of how democratic priorities can transform both educational practice and policy analysis. Specifically, this study demonstrates the norms, values, and technologies that guide mainstream analysis are poorly suited to record and report the strengths of the democratic orientation inspired by Dewey's work. (LMl)
NN (2010). Sidebar: Tracking Student Success from Experimental Schools: The Eight-Year Study from the 1930's. webpage
Wilford M. Aikin, The Story of the Eight-Year Study (1942)
H. H. Giles, S. P. McCutchen, and A. N. Zechiel, Exploring the Curriculum (1942)
Eugene R. Smith and Ralph Tyler, Appraising and Recording Student Progress (1942)
Dean Chamberlin, E. S. Chamberlin, N. E. Drought, and W. E. Scott (1942). Did They Succeed in College? (1942) [not online?]
Thirty Schools Tell Their Story (1943)
A good discussion of the Eight-Year Study also appears in Bruce R. Thomas, "The School as a Moral Learning Community," in John I. Goodlad et al., The Moral Dimensions of Teaching (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990).
Doug Feldman & Tim Watson (2003). The Eight-Year Study Revisted: John Burroughs School, St. Louis, Missouri. Educational Research Quarterly, 27 no. 1. preview
Joanne Brown (1992). The definition of a profession. The authority of metaphor in the history of intelligence testing, 1890-1930. Princeton Universty Press. [als eBook in KB] info
Rhonda Maree Farkota (2015?). The Effects of a 15-minute Direct Instruction Intervention in the Regular Mathematics Class on Students’ Mathematical Self-efficacy and Achievement. Thesis pdf
Progressive education, it was thought, would promote the democratic ideals of individual freedom and autonomy, however, qualitative evaluations of its effect on working class children showed that it actually had anti-progressive outcomes (Grossen, 1993). A comprehensive evaluation (Sharp et al., 1975) on a school that was judged to be a model of progressive education in England, found that the teachers gave successful students far greater attention, interacted with them more frequently and generally paid more attention to their activities. The higher performing children who were from a higher social class received more attention than the lower performing children who were from the lower working class families, thus perpetuating the inequalities of the very system progressive education was attempting to radically reform (Grossen, 1993). Sharp, Green, and Lewis (1975) suggested that, ‘modern child- centred education is an aspect of romantic radical conservatism’ (p. 227). They concluded that student-directed methods of learning actually had the effect of reinforcing the existing social class structure rather than leveling it, as was the intention (Grossen, 1993). They formed the opinion that progressive educators were ‘unwilling victims of a structure that undermines the moral concerns they profess’ (Grossen, 1993, p. 227).
The philosophy behind progressive education in England was against the implementation of standardised tests, thus the learning outcomes of the model were only evaluated with the relatively recent advent of international competitiveness in education. In 1992 there was an outcry when the English Department of Education and Science (DES) reported on an international comparison that more than 60 per cent of the schools in the English sample scored below the lowest scoring Japanese school (para. 49). The official report (Department of Education and Science, 1992) unequivocally blamed the poor achievement levels of English students on the Government endorsed progressive learning model and in 1992 English educational policy officially endorsed teacher-directed instruction (Grossen, 1993). The conclusion was reached that, ‘Whatever else they do primary schools must get their policies and practices right for teaching the basic skills of literacy and numeracy’ (Department of Education and Science, 1992, para 50). In what was the lengthiest and most comprehensive implementation of student-directed learning practices on record the English admitted their experiment with progressive education had failed (Grossen, 1993).”
Scott L. Montgomery (1994). Minds for the making. The role of science in American education, 1750-1990. Guilford Press. isbn 0898621895 info
Dit boek gaat vooral ook over de progressive movement, niet helemaal hetzelfde als wat nu in het VK progressivism heet. Komen uit deze beweging ook al die ideeën zoals ‘wiskundig leren denken’ voor zelfs de kleinere scholiertjes opborrelen? Dat zou best eens kunnen. Het is een fantastisch boek, direct relevant om de huidige inhoudelijke teloorgang van het onderwijs beter te begrijpen. Ik citeer Montgomery’s karakteristiek van het constructivisme.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s constructivism became a unifying concept for much work on science education, a kind of rallying idea for rethinking teaching and the curriculum with the goal of putting the student first. Though not a philosophy self-knighted with the ‘scientific’, it is involved with various psychological theories of learning that do make such claims. Thus, while it seeks to represent itself as the polar opposite to the old positivist view, its followers within the field of pedagogy are no less prone to view it as a means to better promote such things as ‘higher order thinking,’ ‘process skills,’ and ‘conceptual change.’ And even with regard to its ‘Robinson Crusoe model’ of learning, educational constructivism can not overcome problems that have existed for a long time. (..) It is one more theory, in the tradition of G. Stanley Hall and the Herbartarians, that tries to put the human dimension back into learning yet in its own fashion removes it once again.
Andrew Old (Feb 18, 2016). Denying the debate about progressive and traditional education (Part 1) (teachingbattlground @oldandrewuk) blog 1; Feb 19 blog 2
Katherine C. Reynolds (1997). Progressive Ideals and Experimental Higher Education: The Example of John Dewey and Black Mountain College. Education and Culture Spring, 1997 Vol. XIV No. 1 pdf
Joop W. A. Berding (1997). Towards a Flexible Curriculum John Dewey's Theory of Experience and Learning. Education and Culture Spring, 1997 Vol. XIV No. 1, 24-31. pdf
The personal position of Berding is evidently clear from the closing sentence of the article:
J.F. Staring (2013). Midwives of progressive education: The Bureau of Educational Experiments 1916-1919. Nijmegen: Integraal (Werkgroep Integrerende Wetenschapsbeoefening). Dissertation. Supervisors: Merry & Karsten. download
Central to this dissertation is the early history of the New York City Bureau of Educational Experiments (1916-1919). The Bureau was an educational clearinghouse, and it stimulated, subsidized and conducted educational experiments. The Bureau had a previously unacknowledged influence on the founding of the Progressive Education Association. The dissertation sketches the careers of two members of the Bureau: Marietta Johnson (1864-1938) and Caroline Pratt (1867-1954). Both women would become essential links in the establishment of the Progressive Education Association and the formulation of its mission.A number of findings described in the dissertation directly pertain to recommendations made by the Dutch Parliamentary Commission on Educational Reforms in their 2008 report ‘Tijd voor Onderwijs”.
John Dewey, the later works, 1925-1953.
Levine Barbara (2013). Works about John Dewey, 1886-2012. Southern Illinois University Press. [eBook KB]
John Dewey (1912). How we think. Dover. [eBook KB] archive.org
HAMBLETON, R.K., EIGNOR,.D.R., en ROVINELLI, R.J., Toward better achievement tests and testscore interpretations in PSI courses. Journal of Personalized Instruction, 1978, 3, 180-186.
William Heard Kilpatrick https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Heard_Kilpatrick
John Dewey (1930). How Much Freedom in New Schools? New Republic, 9 July 1930, 204 scan
In this article Dewey criticizes the progressives in education, without taking leave of what he himself regards the kernel of progressivism.
John Dewey (1897). My pedagogic creed. School Journal, 54, 77-80 webpage
(197). Creative intelligence; essays in the pragmatic attitude by Dewey, John, 1859-1952; Moore, Addison Webster, 1866-1930; Brown, Harold Chapman, b. 1879; Mead, George Herbert, 1863-1931; Bode, Boyd Henry, 1873-1953; Stuart, Henry Waldgrave, 1871-; Tufts, James H. (James Hayden), 1862-1942; Kallen, Horace Meyer, 1882-1974. online
John Dewey (1902). The child and the curriculum. The University of Chicago Press. archive.org
John Dewey (1938). Experience and education archive.org
John Dewey (1934). Art as experience. doc [contains also The quest for certainty - Individualism old and new - Philosophy and civilization]
Full text of "The Dewey School. The Laboratory School Of The University Of Chicago 1896-1903" by Katherine Camp Mayhew & Anna Camp Edwards (1936). Introduced by John Dewey. Appleton Century. archive.org
This school was a cooperative venture of parents, teachers, and educators, and was carried on at the University of Chicago during the years from 1896 to 1903. Under the direction of John Dewey, then head of the University's unified departments of Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy, the undertaking grew out of a genuine desire to work out with children an educational experience more creative than that provided by even the best of the current systems. a name="Godfrey-Smith">
Eric Kalenze (2017). DO NOT GO STUPID INTO THAT PUMPING BLOOD blog