Rekenproject: Reflecteren
Reflecteren is vooral een modieus begrip, ergens in de tachtiger jaren opgekomen, en nog steeds populair. Wat is de wetenschappelijke basis ervoor? Een eerste ingang biedt het artikel van Matthew & Sternberg (2009). Oonk e.a. (1994) geven een kijkje in hoe een pabo ermee in de weer is. Zicht op de historische oorsprong van het idee is misschien nog wel het meest verhelderend, en zou rap een eind kunnen maken aan veel onberedeneerd geloof in (de waarde van) reflectie: zie wat John Dewey in 1910 in zijn aan dit onderwerp gewijde boek heeft te melden. Er wordt in de literatuur vaak naar dit boek verwezen, maar ik weet nog niet of de reflecteren-beweging zich van meet af aan op dit boek heeft gebaseerd, of het er pas later met de haren heeft nagesleept.
Dat neemt niet weg dat reflecteren wel degelijk een scherpe psychologische betekenis kan krijgen, zoals Michelene Chi (2011) laat zien.
Michelene T. H. Chi (2011). Theoretical Perspectives, Methodological Approaches, and Trends in the Study of Expertise. In Yeping Li & Gabriele Kaiser (Eds.) (2011). Expertise in Mathematics Instruction, An International Perspective (17-40). Springer. site - http://goo.gl/8zcFF - aantekeningen.
Routinematige expertise bestaat eruit dat je weet wat te doen in geval van conditie A. Maar wat te doen wanneer je situatie A + B aantreft? Michelene Chi bespreekt hier (zie blz. 32) kort het begrip ‘aanpassende expertise’ (adaptive expertise): de expertise die is verkregen door verdieping in de betekenis etcetera van de conditie A. Reflectie op A. Self-explaining A, in relatie tot de betreffende regel. Wat ik in Toetsvragen ontwerpen (hfdst. 6) inferentie heb genoemd. Als ik de term ‘reflecteren’ aanhoud, dan zou daarmee bedoeld kunnen zijn dat de expert bij het toepassen van de productieregel (zie bv Newell & Simon, 1972) zich bewust is van wat hij doet en meer kennis probeert te krijgen van de conditie, en de daarbij behorende regel.
- However, a more intriguing second idea of adaptive expertise is the notion of a
propensity or predisposition to learn while performing. That is, the idea is that while
practicing or executing a skill, adaptive experts are ones who seek to learn more
from the experience, seek help from others, experiment with new ideas, as if they
are not satisfied with what they already know and can do (Bransford & Schwartz,
2009).
blz. 32
Bransford, J., & Schwartz, D. (2009). It takes expertise to make expertise: Some thoughts about why and how and reflections on the themes. In K. A. Ericsson (Ed.), Development of professional expertise: Toward measurement of expert performance and design of optimal learning environments (pp. 432–448). Cambridge University Press. isbn 9780521740081 zie site
Roy F. Baumeister, E. J. Masicampo & Kathleen D. Vohs (2011). Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior? Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 331-361. pdf
D. Mansvelder-Longayroux, D. Beijaard en N. Verloop (2002). Het portfolio als reflectie-instrument voor docenten-in-opleiding. Pedagosche Studiën, 79, 269-286.
abstract (doc)
Het abstract geeft eigenlijk wel glashelder aan wat het probleem is met al dat reflecteren: het levert niets nieuws op, een vorm van herkauwen dus. Ik heb geen flauw idee voor welke hersenkwabben dat goed is.
R. Vandenberghe en G. Kelchtermans (2002). Leraren die leren om professioneel te blijven leren:
kanttekeningen over context. Pedagosche Studiën, 79, 339-351.
abstract (.doc)
In de onderwijswereld wordt met reflecteren iets totaal anders bedoeld dan wat Michelene Chi (zie hierboven) aanduidt. Het komt naar mijn smaak te dicht in de buurt van oeverloze zielenknijperij en zelfkwelling. Zoals volgend citaat, keurig geformuleerd natuurlijk, al aangeeft:
2.3 Leren reflecteren: moeilijk, maar noodzakelijk breed en diepDe artikelen in dit nummer illustreren en bevestigen de vaststelling in de internationale onderzoeksliteratuur dat leren reflecteren van cruciaal belang is voor professionele ontwikkeling, maar dat het om een complexe en moeilijke vaardigheid gaat.
Nina Bonderup Dohn (2011). On the epistemological presuppositions of reflective activities. Educational Theory, 61, 671-708.
abstract
Central to this article is the claim that reflective activities manifest epistemological presuppositions about the nature of competence, knowledge, and learning, and about the relation between thinking, communicating, and acting. These presuppositions are not identified, much less dealt with, in the literature seeking to clarify the concept of reflection. This literature tends to look at expounded views on reflection rather than at the practical presuppositions of activities. As such, the presuppositions have gone unnoticed — in theory and in practice.
( . . . )
In the course of assessing — and challenging — the presuppositions, I articulate a view of knowledge, competence, and learning that takes the Scandinavian interpretation of Wittgenstein as its starting point and integrates insights from Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and situated learning. The outcome of the analysis is that the presuppositions of the paradigm reflective activities are misguided. The reflective activities themselves are therefore also misguided. As a consequence, engaging in them leads to pitfalls, namely of establishing independent secondary reflection practices with their own evaluative criteria and of initiating a self-referential development of practice representations increasingly out of touch with practice. The existence of these pitfalls is illustrated with empirical examples.
W. Oonk, R. Keijzer, K. Olofsen, C.A.J. de Vet, K. Tjon Soei Sjoe, N. Blom, P.F.J. Ale & A. Markusse (1994). Reflecteren als gereedschap. Tijdschrift voor nascholing en onderzoek van het reken-wiskundeonderwijs. jaargang 12 nummer 4, 3-16pdf
Cynthia T. Matthew & Robert J. Sternberg (2009). Developing experience-based (tacit) knowledge through reflection. Learning and Individual Differences, 20, 345-357.
Reflection on experience has been advocated as a way to facilitate experience-based learning primarily in organizational/management and education literatures (Argyris, 1991, 1994, 1999; Kolb, 1984; Marsick, 1988, 1990; Marsick & Watkins, 1997; Raelin, 1997; Schön, 1983, 1987; Seibert & Daudelin, 1999). It is defined here as a process of guided critical thinking that directs attention selectively to various aspects of experience, making knowledge typically acquired without conscious awareness explicit and available for examination and modification. Although the role of reflection has long been established as an important component of experience-based learning, it remains unclear what the benefits and limitations are of different types of reflection and to what extent they appreciably enhance professional performance. The vast majority of empirical studies of workplace learning between 1990 and 2002 have been conducted at an organizational level of analysis (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004). More individual level empirical work is needed to inform the design of reflection methods that are associated with particular performance outcomes and increase our understanding of underlying psychological processes (Seibert & Daudelin, 1999).
This study investigated the effectiveness of reflection methods derived from the practical intelligence subtheory (Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002; Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund, Horvath, Wagner, Williams et al., 2000) of Sternberg's theory of successful intelligence (1983, 1985, 1988, 1996, 2005). According to the theory, there are individual differences in the ability to learn from experience (practical intelligence) and acquire tacit knowledge, an important component of it. Moreover, the theory suggests that the ability to learn from experience can be developed. Sternberg's theory provides a cognitive account of how experience-based tacit knowledge is acquired specifying cognitive processes that can be made explicit to facilitate the acquisition of tacit knowledge. When these processes are applied to the design of reflection methodology, major conceptual approaches in the organizational/management and education literatures are neatly encompassed.
C. Argyris, Theories of action that inhibit individual learning, American Psychologist (1976), pp. 638-654.
C. Argyris, Teaching smart people how to learn, Harvard Business Review 69 (3) (1991), pp. 99-109.
C. Argyris, On organizational learning, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford (1994).
C. Argyris, Tacit knowledge and management. In: R.J. Sternberg and J.A. Horvath, Editors, Tacit knowledge in professional practice, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ (1999), pp. 123-140.
D.A. Kolb, Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ (1984).
V.J. Marsick, Learning in the workplace: The case for reflectivity and critical reflectivity, Adult Education Quarterly 38 (4) (1988), pp. 187-198.
V.J. Marsick and K.E. Watkins, Lessons from informal and incidental learning. In: J. Burgoyne and M. Reynolds, Editors, Management learning: Integrating perspectives in theory and practice, Sage, London (1997), pp. 295-311.
J.A. Raelin, A model of work-based learning, Organization Science 8 (6) (1997), pp. 563-578.
D.A. Schön, The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action, Basic Books, Inc. (1983).
D.A. Schön, Educating the reflective practitioner, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco (1987).
K.W. Seibert and M.W. Daudelin, The role of reflection in managerial learning: Theory, research, and practice, Quorum, Westport, CT (1999).
H. Bapuji and M. Crossan, From questions to answers: Reviewing organizational learning research, Management Learning 35 (4) (2004), pp. 397-417.
R.J. Sternberg and J. Hedlund, Practical intelligence, g, and work psychology, Human Performance 15 (1/2) (2002), pp. 143-160.
R.J. Sternberg, G.B. Forsythe, J. Hedlund, J.A. Horvath, R.K. Wagner, W.M. Williams, S.A. Snook and E.L. Grigorenko, Practical intelligence in everyday life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000).
R.J. Sternberg, Intelligence as developing expertise, Contemporary Educational Psychology 24 (1999), pp. 359-375.
John Dewey (1910). How we think. D. C. Heath & Co, Publishers. pdf 10 Mb
“OUR schools are troubled with a multiplication of studies, each in turn having its own multiplication of materials and principles. Our teachers find their tasks made heavier in that they have come to deal with pupils individually and not merely in mass. Unless these steps in advance are to end in distraction, some clew of unity, some principle that makes for simplification, must be found. This book represents the conviction that the needed steadying and centralizing factor is found in adopting as the end of endeavor that attitude of mind, that habit of thought, which we call scientific. This scientific attitude of mind might, conceivably, be quite irrelevant to teaching children and youth. But this book also represents the conviction that such is not the case; that the native and unspoiled, attitude of childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, fertile imagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near, very near, to the attitude of the scientific mind. If these pages assist any to appreciate this kinship and to consider seriously how its recognition in educational practice would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste, the book will amply have served its purpose.”
uit het voorwoord, blz. iii
Dewey begint zijn boek met de vraag wat denken is. Onder andere is dat het hebben van een overtuiging die berust op bepaalde gronden of vormen van bewijs.
“ . . . . the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in value, and it forms, accordingly, the principal subject of this volume.”
p. 1-2
“Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a consequence — a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in turn leans back on its predecessors. The successive portions of the reflective thought grow out of one another and support one another; they do not come and go in a medley. Each phase is a step from something to something — technically speaking, it is a term of thought. Each term leaves a deposit which is utilized in the next term. The stream or flow becomes a train, chain, or thread.”
p. 5
Deze Deweyaanse reflectie doet me denken aan inferentie: reflecteren is dan een combinatie van analyse (wat is de onderbouwing van je idee) met inferentie (hoe is je idee verbonden met andere ideeën).
“Belief in the world's flatness commits him who holds it to thinking in certain specific ways of other objects, such as the heavenly bodies, antipodes, the possibility of navigation. It prescribes to him actions in accordance with his conception of these objects.
The consequences of a belief upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be so important, then, that men are forced to consider the grounds or reasons of their belief and its logical consequences. This means reflective thought — thought in its eulogistic and emphatic sense.
”
p. 5
“
Active, persistent, and careful consideration
of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought.
. . . . it is a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of reasons.
”
p. 6
Marianne Elshout-Mohr & Jetske van den Bijtel (1994). Reflecteren: een nuttige ambachtelijke vaardigheid. SCO-rapport 352. [niet in mijn bezit, helaas]
F. A. J. Korthagen & Th. Wubbels (1989). De effecten van een opleiding die tot doel heeft aanstaande leraren te leren reflecteren. Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsresearch, 214-226.
F. Korthagen (1983). Leren reflecteren als basis van de lerarenopleiding. Een model voor de opleiding van leraren, in het bijzonder wiskundeleraren. Proefschrift. [nog niet gezien]
D. Mansfelder-Longayroux, D. Beijaard & N. Verloop (2002). Het portfolio als reflectie-instrument voor docenten-in-opleiding. Pedagogische Studiën, 79, 269-286.
Just What Is Being Reflected in Online Reflection? New Literacies for New Media Learning Practices. Jen Ross. In Lone Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Vivien Hodgson & David McConnell (Eds.) (2012). Exploring the Theory, Pedagogy and Practice of Networked Learning. Springer.
Tom Luken (2015). De schaduw van reflectie. In M. Boer, M. Hoonhout, & J. Oosting (red.), Supervisiekunde meerperspectivisch (pp. 147-161). Deventer: Vakmedianet.
pdf
The evolution of the social roletaking and guided re#ection framework in teacher education: recent theory and quantitative synthesis of research.
Alan J. Reiman (1999). Teaching and Teacher Education, 15, 597-612.
pdf
P.H. vd Ven: Reflecteren: het belang van kennis.
pdf
Hans van Doremalen en Charles Vandalon (2017). Leren reflecteren. didactiefonline blog
Ietje Pauw (2007).
De kunst van het navelstaren. De didactische implicaties van de retorisering van reflectieverslagen op de pabo. Een exploratieve studie
Proefschrift Universiteit Utrecht open
Piet-Hein v/d Ven. Reflecteren: het belang van kennis (van wie is dit stuk? Waarin gepubliceerd? Velon tijdschrift voor lerarenopleiders.
"Reflecteren doet een reflector. Of een rogeriaanse psychotherapeut. Tegenwoordig dus ook leden van ons parlement." Een lang twistgesprek met Gisbert van Ginkel, eindigend in een soort van gezamenlijk standpunt: een reflectie is een activiteit, geen prestatie (ik verwees naar de P- en H-onderdelen die A. D. de Groot onderscheidt, 1972). De
Twitterdraad is moeilik te volgen door vee vertakkingen.
http://www.benwilbrink.nl/projecten/reflecteren.htm
http://goo.gl/htx84